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Abstract
Longevity risk has become a major challenge for governments, individuals, and
annuity providers in most countries, and especially its aggregate form, i.e. the
risk of unsystematic changes to general mortality patterns, bears a large potential
for accumulative losses for insurers. As obvious risk management tools such as
(re)insurance or hedging are less suited to manage an annuity provider’s exposure
to aggregate longevity risk, the current paper proposes a new type of life annuities
with benefits contingent on actual mortality experience, and it also details actuar-
ial aspects of implementation. Similar adaptations to conventional product design
exist in investment-linked annuities, and a role model for long-term contracts con-
tingent on actual cost experience is found in German private health insurance so
that the idea is not novel in general, but it is in the context of longevity risk.
By not or re-transferring the systematic longevity risk insurers may avoid accu-
mulative losses so that the primary focus in an extensive Monte-Carlo simulation
is on the question of whether and to what extent such products are also advan-
tageous for policyholders in contrast to a comparable conventional annuity product.
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1 Motivation and Introduction
For quite a while scholars and practitioners – not only with a focus on insurance but also
with backgrounds such as sociology, demography, health sciences, and other areas – have
been discussing a globally observable phenomenon commonly named demographic transition.1
Strong, sustaining changes of mortality, fertility, migration and other factors have tremendously
affected the age structures of most countries’ population, and a rapid increase of average
individual lifetime is a predominant consequence. Inseparably linked to a reduction of mortality
rates at virtually all ages, it may be considered more than welcome from each individual’s
point of view, and it can also be recognized as a societal achievement and major success of
well-functioning public health and old-age care systems, improved working conditions, and also
healthier lifestyles.
Often cited as longevity trend, it can be traced back approximately 100–150 years for most
Western countries.2 Looking at female life expectancies in several countries, Oeppen and Vau-
pel (2002) impressively show that each individual country has experienced a steady growth of
lifetime during the past 150 years which is a strong argument supporting this notion. Even
more interestingly, when taking together all countries, the existence of a global linear trend
also seems to be supported.
The risk of outliving one’s savings or other financial resources to cover expenses during
retirement could also be understood as some sort of individual longevity risk, but the same
term has been used in the literature also to refer to individual fluctuations around a general
average mortality, i.e. the risk of living shorter or longer than the average member of the
respective group of individuals. In fact, life and pension insurance are based on a balancing of
risks across sufficiently large portfolios, and they make explicit use of the individual fluctuations
around an average value without which the entire functioning of insurance would have to be
put into question. While some annuity contracts terminate sooner some cease later so that the
entire portfolio of contracts is eventually balanced, and with an increasing number of policies
results stabilize.3
However, the term aggregate longevity risk has been used rather to refer to the additional
uncertainty about changes in the underlying patterns, and this particular risk can be consid-
ered a major concern for insurers. Because, given a sufficiently prudent selection of the insured
portfolio, an insurer can well diversify the unsystematic, individual form of this risk and should
on average not suffer losses nor generate gains from mortality differences. The aggregate form
can also be considered a systematic risk since it refers to unforeseeable random changes rep-
resenting strong correlations between single contracts and thus a potential for accumulative
losses. Of course, while differences between single countries exist, the aggregate form of this
risk becomes even more threatening when seen from an international perspective as would
appear suitable for a global primary insurance group or most reinsurers.
Increasing life expectancy has not been paralleled by a similar prolongation of working life,
and individuals tend to survive a substantial, increasing number of years beyond retirement age.
Thus, individual provision for an adequate and sufficient standard of living has become one of
1 See Montgomery (2007) for a depiction and explanation of different stages of demographic transition.
2 For a discussion not limited to Western industrialized nations see e.g. United Nations (2005).
3 See for instance Leinert and Wagner (2001) for an analysis of intergenerational effects in the German private
annuities market caused by the longevity trend.
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the most pressing challenges for 21st century societies. Insurance contracts as the traditionally
dominating instruments for transferring financial risks offer the possibility to transfer longevity
risk exposure by means of life annuity contracts.4
Here, the insurer can be considered to be in a situation similar to the short position in a
forward contract on the annuitants’ survival, and the actual remaining number of years to live
is uncertain for both the annuitant and the provider. In the view of the longevity trend it thus
seems to be quite risky for an insurer to promise nominally fixed annuity payments contingent
on the policyholder’s survival – yet this might be the most desirable contract design for the
(potential) annuitant. Insurers are thus challenged to reconcile exposure to longevity risk and
their customers’ growing demand for adequately designed insurance products.
Curiosity has driven research for adequate mortality models for quite some time5, yet none of
them has been universal enough to accurately fit observed mortality patterns for all countries
and all time periods, and it is quite unlikely that such models will ever exist.6
One of the most prominent stochastic models for mortality was proposed by Lee and Carter
(1992, henceforth LC), and it has rapidly gained acceptance in academia and among practi-
tioners, which could partly be due to its relative simplicity.7 However, in its original form it
has a number of shortcomings, such as the homoscedasticity of error terms, which Alho (2000)
criticized as somewhat unrealistic, or a lack of simple implementation. Among a large number
of extensions (see, for example, Lee (2000) or Renshaw and Haberman (2003)) is an approach
presented by Brouhns et al. (2002) who resort to the notion that the number of deaths can
be regarded as a Poisson counting process. This implies that error terms are heteroscedastic,
which seems to be more realistic, and their model has also the advantage that parameters can
be estimated iteratively, thus greatly facilitating computations. This alternative approach is
thus adopted here and will be referred to as PML (Poisson Maximum Likelihood).
It needs to be mentioned that two major concerns persist when applying any model: model
uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty of whether a specific model is at all suitable for describing
the underlying data, and parameter uncertainty, i.e. the question of whether – given a specific
model – the respective parameters are correctly estimated by using observed data from the
past. These potential drawbacks must be accepted as inherent to fitting models to data from
the past in order to obtain projections for the future. They cannot be completely avoided,
but rather need to be kept in mind when analyzing results. It is a hope that the accuracy
and detailedness of models will be further increased, and some restrictions which have existed
in the past (such as technical limitations or implementation issues) have become negligible.
Ultimately, a wide range of models and sufficient knowledge about when to use which of them
can be expected.
Among the typical instruments implemented within a structured, iterative risk management
process techniques such as hedging or risk transfer, e.g. through insurance, are widely used.
4 An extensive investigation for how people in Germany have made provisions for their old-age income is
provided e.g. by GDV (2004).
5 Note for instance the well-known early models proposed by De Moivre (1756), Gompertz (1825), or Makeham
(1860).
6 For a detailed overview and a categorization of several stochastic mortality models see e.g. Cairns et al.
(2006).
7 For example, the Lee-Carter model served as a starting point for mortality forecasting models used by the
U.S. Social Security Administration; see for instance Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998) or Lee et al. (2003) and
Edwards et al. (2003).
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However, due to the strong correlation and thus potential accumulative losses it may be ques-
tioned whether the aggregate form of longevity risk can be insured without restrictions at all.
Even when pooled with large reinsurance companies, the systematic risk associated with the
longevity trend still prevails and cannot be offset by larger portfolio sizes, i.e. the Law of Large
Numbers is likely to fail and not to alleviate the threat affected insurers might be facing.
Successful hedging on the other hand requires that an insurer engages in financial transac-
tions that effectively cancel or offset the exposure to the particular risk in question. Though
often proposed, natural hedging, i.e. a balancing of exposures to mortality (life insurance) and
longevity risk (annuities), seems at least questionable due to many potential drawbacks. For in-
stance contract terms, relevant ages, or (anti-)selection effects do all speak rather against such
an opportunity, but advances in this field could of course provide insurers with an additional
tool to mitigate aggregate longevity risk.
Eventually, it may seem worthwhile to resort to another risk management tool: risk avoid-
ance. More precisely, by avoiding to assume the aggregate or systematic portion of longevity
risk in annuity contracts, an insurer may effectively reduce this particular exposure. However,
since it is usually a key feature of life annuities, the strategy of avoidance effectively means
that not the entire risk would be transferred or, equivalently, that to some extent it is ex-post
shifted back to the policyholders. Riemer-Hommel and Trauth (2005) claim that such adjust-
ments would be “uncompetitive” but do not further investigate these innovations but instead
concentrate on reinsurance and hedging, among other tools.
The present contribution is designed to address the question of how exactly providers could
make adaptations to the still predominant “classic” product designs. For this purpose, an
annuity type with benefits linked to actual mortality experience is proposed including an un-
derlying actuarial model for calculation and reserving. By not or re-transferring the systematic
longevity risk insurers may avoid accumulative losses so that the primary focus in an extensive
Monte-Carlo simulation is on the question of whether and to what extent such products are
also advantageous for policyholders in contrast to a comparable conventional annuity product.
2 Risk Avoidance through Product Redesign
2.1 Introductory Remarks
As mentioned before, the choices of hedging or (re)insurance as common risk management tools,
which in many other cases are straightforward, seem to be either unavailable or unsuitable for
an affected insurance company to adequately manage this type of exposure. If instead annuity
providers seek to reduce or diminish their exposure through avoidance of aggregate mortality
risk, the most drastic way would of course be to not sell life annuities and similar products at
all. Consequently also all the opportunities these products can provide would be forgone, and
this “solution” would also deprive individuals or insurees of the opportunity of transferring
any part of their personal longevity risk. It thus seems interesting from a welfare point of
view whether less drastic risk management options exist that still allow for a transfer of at
least the non-systematic portion of the risk. One way of tackling this could be to exclude (or
reduce) the provider’s exposure to systematic longevity risk. Apart from the immediate fact
that insurance companies may have a preference for such a curtailed product, it is less obvious
whether or not such adaptation is disadvantageous for policyholders, challenging the asserted
“uncompetitiveness” claimed by Riemer-Hommel and Trauth (2005).
A specific redesign of conventional life annuities will be proposed and further analyzed below.
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Note at this point that annuity markets have already seen similar (successful) changes of
conventional product designs which will be briefly presented in Section 2.2, and this may
serve as a justification for turning away from conventional, established products in the present
context, aiming at reducing an insurer’s exposure to systematic longevity risk. Also note
that potential role models for the exclusion of a specific, “systematic” part of risk otherwise
transferred to insurers exist in other lines of insurance, and one such model further discussed in
Section 2.3 exhibits similarities to the problem of undesirable aggregate longevity risk exposure
in conventional life annuities.
2.2 Previous Modifications of Conventional Annuities
“Traditional” life annuities in Germany (and many other countries) have long included a valu-
able, yet conservative guarantee of a minimum interest rate earned on the premiums paid. As
actual returns on the insurers’ investments often exceeded these minimum yields the excess
amounts were consequently largely distributed to policyholders.8 This mechanism obviously
requires little or no interaction by policyholders, and as long as capital market yields (and thus
effective rates of return) were substantially higher than minimum guarantees, insurers could
well use the argument of (historically) attractive surplus participation for marketing purposes.
However, more innovative products such as unit-linked or variable annuities have been de-
signed and successfully introduced in the insurance markets.9 A distinct feature is the fact that
the investment risk is not borne by the insurer but by the policyholder who may often choose
from only a limited range of investment bundles offered by the insurer. With an increase of
private persons’ general interest in capital market investments and awareness of the potential
for higher returns against a (higher) risk, investment-linked annuities have gained a sizeable
share in the pension products market.10
Despite the admittedly different circumstances of risk “non-transfer”, just the transition
from no investment performance risk for the policyholder to bearing (some of) it does not only
give a counterexample to the notion that policyholders would in general reject any changes to
traditional products. Under certain circumstances they might even be interested in taking on
a significant share of the risk. Of course, policyholders would only accept this additional risk
if they are adequately compensated for, or rather if such an alternative features lower prices or
8 German statutory regulation requires insurers to redistribute at least 90% of investment returns earned from
the policyholders’ reserves in excess of the minimum guarantee. Such provisions for Germany, applicable to
different “generations” of life insurance and life annuities contratcs are governed by Verordnung über die Min-
destbeitragsrückerstattung in der Lebensversicherung (Mindestzuführungsverordnung – MindZV) as of April
04, 2008 (see BGBl. I S.690), Verordnung über die Mindestbeitragsrückerstattung in der Lebensversicherung
(ZRQuotenV) as of July 23, 1996 (see BGBl. I S.1190), and Verordnung über die Berechnung und Höhe
des Rückgewährrichtsatzes, des Normrisikoüberschusses und des Normzinsertrages in der Lebensversicherung
(Rückgewährquote-Berechnungsverordnung – RQV) as of March 28, 1984 (see BGBl. I S.496), respectively.
As an industry practice, the actual fraction of redistributed execess returns had often been even higher.
9 The term unit-linked annuities generally refers to deferred annuities where during the accumulation phase the
premiums paid are accrued according to the performance of a certain type of investment, chosen or at least
influenced by the policyholder, whereas variable annuities also link the actual amount of benefits during the
payout phase to an investment performance indicator. In a sense, both products do not promise nominally
fixed annuity benefits as would be the case with conventional annuities, but in the former case the amount of
benefits can ultimately be determined at the inception date of the payout phase. For a discussion of especially
the latter annuity type see e.g. Mutschler and Ruß (2001).
10 Relevant statistical data for e.g. Germany can be found in the series “Statistical Yearbook of German In-
surance” which is regularly published by the German Insurance Association (GDV), the most recent being
GDV (2008).
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additional benefits in comparison to the “conventional” product, and this is likely to depend
on their individual degree of risk aversion.11
Not to be overlooked is the observation that the notion of benefits being linked to demo-
graphic development in general, or mortality experience in particular, may actually be not so
uncommon in some countries. For instance, the German public pension system, which is orga-
nized on a pay-as-you-go basis, delivers benefits that are set by statutory ordinance including a
so-called “demographic factor”. Thus no ultimate guarantee as to the exact amount of pension
payments can be made during the working life, and also thereafter benefits may be changed
by legislators as appropriate. Naturally, the demographic transition has also had an impact
on population age structures in Germany, and as a consequence social security benefits have
barely compensated for inflation. Despite an entirely different range of problems and challenges
associated with public pay-as-you-go pension systems, this thought should contribute to the
notion of benefits contingent on mortality experience being considered as an interesting design
option.
2.3 An Example for Policies Shifting Insurance Risk Back to the Insured: German
Private Health Insurance
The above mentioned idea of linking annuity benefits not to investment performance but to
actual mortality experience – be it that of a given portfolio of insureds, of an insurance company,
the insurance industry as a whole, or a specific country’s population – is not a novel idea in
the sense that products accounting for loss experience would not exist. However, due to the
extreme long-term character of life annuity contracts, which can easily exceed 40 years, it is
not a trivial problem to connect the actual realizations of the insured risk to future benefits.
A comparable concept can for instance be found in insurance contracts as they are common
in the German private health market.12 With the exception of civil servants, freelancers, and
higher-income earners, these products are mostly just supplemental for the vast majority of the
population, which are generally covered by the public health insurance branch of the German
social security system. However, the basic actuarial concept of long-term health contracts is
similar to life annuities, and this is a distinct feature in comparison to many countries where
health insurance bears more similarities to property/casualty insurance.13 In exchange for
recurring constant premium payments, health care costs are covered for the entire lifetime of
the insured person. This way, excessive costs for increasingly needed medical procedures at
older ages are avoided at the cost of premiums that are higher than necessary at younger ages.
Another similarity is the fact that it would be a special challenge to adequately predict the
future development of health care costs at the time of contract inception. Generally speaking,
the health care cost inflation has historically been higher than e.g. the consumer price index
development, and in tendency further innovations in medical procedures and techniques also
lead to more expensive treatments. This special type of uncertainty can be compared to the
11 The rare case of risk lovers longing to forgo guarantees without any compensation from the annuity provider
seems quite absurd here, as such individuals might be inclined to refrain from buying insurance anyway.
12 See Brünjes (1990) for specific technical details regarding Germany. Timmer (1990) provides a multi-country
comparison.
13 This is the case e.g. in the US where health insurance is mostly sold on an annual basis without premium
guarantees but typically with an option for the insured to annually renew the policy. For further details see
e.g. Black and Skipper (2000, p.140ff).
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aggregate form of longevity risk, where a general tendency can be identified but where the
exact future development is hard to determine.
To enable insurers to still provide lifelong coverage despite cost inflation, premiums may be
increased (and also have to be lowered) in the case and to the extent that actual benefits paid
for a portfolio of policies exceed (or under-run) presumed amounts, i.e. if current premiums
turn out to be insufficient (or higher than necessary). Of course, as it does not seem advisable
to make such adjustments every time the actual expenses in a period even marginally differ
from previous projections, legislation in Germany requires expenses to be above or below a
certain threshold in order for premium adjustments to be permissible. Effectively, policyholders
thus bear the risk of systematic health care cost increases, which the insurer may completely
pass on, and in this context it has also been named premium risk; see e.g. Kifmann (2000,
2002). It is also obvious that the extent of premium increases or decreases highly depends on
whether a certain trend of health care cost development is already incorporated in the rate
making process. Yet, the scope for such assumptions is also limited by the marketability and
competitiveness in the market, and health insurers in Germany do generally not make use of
projections for their rate making.
The concept of shifting back a systematic risk to policyholders could also be transferred
to annuity markets, where annuity providers seek to manage or mitigate their exposure to
systematic longevity risk, and this notion will be further discussed in the following.
2.4 Implementation Issues and Appraisal
Recurring to the other major alteration of conventional annuity design that has been mentioned
earlier, investment-linked products shift some part of the risk back to the policyholders. Despite
some similarities there are also some pronounced differences in comparison to annuity benefits
that are made dependent of a portfolio’s actual mortality experience, and those will be briefly
pointed out.
While in the case of mortality-linked annuities or adjustable health insurance products it is
the insurance industry that has a strong incentive to dispose itself of the highly correlated risks
of health cost inflation or – analogously – aggregate longevity14 to avoid potential accumulative
losses, this is less likely the case with investment-linked products. Rather a general interest of
policyholders in participating in higher capital market returns may be the driving force here.
However, investment performance can hardly be influenced by policyholders, especially when
thinking of the general average individual and the extremely long contract terms. Thus, moral
hazard does not seem to play a role in this case. On the other hand, in health insurance there
is a great potential for such unobservable policyholder behavior, and it must be thoroughly
accounted for. The actually observable increase of health care costs may in part be due to ex-
post moral hazard arising from the fact that policyholders once in need for (covered) medical
procedures consume (motivated by themselves; see Feldstein (1973, p.252)) or receive (through
medical providers; see e.g. Feldstein (1970, 1971)) more or more expensive treatments than
they would without insurance coverage, i.e. when paying out of their own pocket, which can be
considered a quantity effect.15 Note that in incomplete “repair markets” there is also a price
14 This notion could also be applied to brevity, i.e. shorter than expected lifetime, due to e.g. pandemics or
catastrophe events.
15 Nell et al. (2009) investigate the effect of insurance on “repair markets” and this includes the demand for
“medical repairs”. Since it is impossible to write complete insurance contracts, often rather actual expenses
are compensated for, and this has an effect on repair markets; see e.g. Feldstein (1970), Zweifel and Crivelli
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effect due to a limited price elasticity, and this contributes additionally towards increasing
health care costs. Fortunately, these effects would not be present in the case of indexed
life annuities. In particular, it is quite unlikely that policyholders have any possibility to
intentionally expand their respective individual lifetimes once insurance coverage is provided.
However, another type of asymmetric information is equally inherent to both health in-
surance and life annuities. In neither case does the insurer know as much about the health
status (or the “true” life expectancy) as the individual herself. In health insurance, it is thus
common to use extensive questionnaires or even require medical examination reports prior to
the contract acceptance. The intention is to overcome this asymmetry and offer accordingly
discriminated premiums that account for the individual health status. In the annuities busi-
ness, however, such premium discrimination is largely inexistent with few exceptions so far.16
Instead, premiums are calculated based on almost the “worst case”, i.e. assuming that insured
persons experience rather long lifetimes. Presuming that individuals have a relatively precise
understanding of what their individual life expectancy is (which could well be questioned),
those with a poorer than average health status are thus likely to be driven out of these mar-
kets. Consequently, conventional products in tendency rather attract persons with higher life
expectancies, and in tendency the portfolio of insured is composed only of individual risks
representing the poorest quality from the provider’s perspective.17 The extent to which such
anti-selection occurs in the annuity market might also be dependent on the characteristics of
the annuity contracts offered. In particular, the fact whether immediate or deferred annuities
at variable or fixed annuitization conditions are offered or whether they include a lump-sum
payout option at some age(s) are likely to have an influence on the degree of adverse selection.
Further investigation into these issues is beyond the scope of this contribution, though.
While premium adjustments in the German private health insurance business are triggered
by the experience of a suitably confined portfolio of contracts, it is up to the insurer to deter-
mine this partitioning, and for outside stakeholders in general or policyholders in particular it
may be difficult to retrace the insurer’s decision. Furthermore, the credibility of actual cost
experience is at least limited from the policyholders’ point of view unless they are based on
industry cost figures. A similar consideration of course applies to the case of actual mortality
experience as a basis for indexed annuities. Unlike the question of what health care costs
exactly are to be considered, it seems hardly disputable how deaths are to be counted. How-
ever, the maximum possible degree of objectivity and traceability can only be reached when
the general population mortality as published by a governmental statistics agency or an of-
ficial actuarial authority is the basis for further considerations. For instance, in the UK the
Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) is in charge of publishing life tables. Naturally,
the general population’s or insured persons’ mortality is not necessarily identical to a specific
annuity provider’s experience. The opposite extreme would be to base any sort of adjustments
on the experience of an insurance company or even a specific portfolio, thus completely dis-
pelling basis risk at the cost of limited transparency.18 No general recommendation on this
(1996), or Pavcnik (2002).
16 Impaired or enhanced annuities aim at providing higher benefits for individuals with a significantly poorer
health status upon sufficient proof by the policyholder. Schumacher (2008) further analyzes these products,
which seem to be established only in the UK annuity market but are not yet common elsewhere.
17 This is just the famous example of Akerlof’s “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970) where under asymmetric information
without remedies only the worst quality in the market is eventually traded.
18 In investment-linked annuities as briefly mentioned in Section 2.2, the general idea is to connect the policy
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particular issue can be made here, but the trade-off between transparency and basis risk has
to be pondered in each case.
The bottom line of the above deliberations is that neither of the two presented cases exactly
mirror the challenge of transferring aggregate longevity risk in life annuities to the policyholders
through an appropriate redesign of conventional products. However, both do, firstly, give a
strong example of successful changes to conventional products and, secondly, may serve as a
rough guideline for how actual losses or expenditure experience can be used for adjustments
of premiums or (as will be the case here) benefits.
For annuities of the above-mentioned type making benefits contingent on actual mortality
experience the term mortality-indexed annuity (MIA) will be used throughout this paper.
Surprisingly, such products do not seem to be offered yet by insurers in the most important
insurance markets nor visibly discussed in academia.19
Acknowledging that it may not be immediately desirable for policyholders not being able
to transfer their entire longevity risk exposure, it has to be kept in mind that the aggregate
form of longevity risk bears a great threat for insurers. Thus, the “solution” represented by
the proposed MIA could be a step in the right direction for annuity providers to get this highly
correlated risk under control. Such a means of risk avoidance (or reduction) might also foster
sluggish annuity markets, and eventually it may be better if insurers offer curtailed products
rather than none at all.
2.5 Proposed Product Features
As was suggested before, it remains to be decided how specifically an annuity provider can
reduce or eliminate aggregate longevity risk exposure from the contracts offered in the insurance
market. In the “plain vanilla” case of a single premium immediate annuity (SPIA), there is
no recurring premium that could be adjusted like in German health insurance. Consequently,
the benefits are one remaining parameter, and in fact there is no necessity for benefits to be
constant or nominally fixed throughout the contract term nor in any fashion pre-determined.20
The innovation proposed here is that at specified intervals the insurance company will adjust
the benefits of a mortality-indexed annuity for the remaining periods (contingent on survival)
in a way that reflects the difference between actual mortality experience and anticipated values
since the most recent adjustment date, keeping in mind the above mentioned trade-off between
basis risk for the insurer versus transparency in terms of the relevant underlying portfolio.21
Simply speaking, if more insureds than anticipated are still alive, benefits have to be cut in
reserves to a specific funds’ development. If instead an overall stock index performance or other comprehensive
indicator is considered – regardless of how exactly these funds are invested – those contracts would rather be
called equity-indexed annuities; see for instance Tiong (2000), Lee (2003), or Lin and Tan (2003).
19 A web search on both www.google.com and scholar.google.com in February 2009 did not yield any results for
the keywords mortality[-| ]indexed annuit[y|ies], and for the keywords indexed annuit[y|ies] none
were related to actual mortality experience.
20 This is to be understood from a pure actuarial perspective at this point. In reality it is likely that legal
and statutory requirements limit the possibility for variable annuity benefits. For instance, to qualify for
favorable tax deferral, non-investment-linked life annuity contracts in Germany may only offer constant or
increasing payments which excludes decrements; cf. BMF-Schreiben, Decmeber 22, 2005 IVC1-S2252-343/05,
Rz 20.
21 For the sake of simplicity, in the following it will be assumed that adjustments in MIA contracts can be based
on the respective portfolio’s mortality experience without regulatory objection.
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order to still guarantee lifelong payments given the higher number of survivors. Alternatively,
a higher number of deaths will lead to increased benefits for the (fewer) survivors.
More frequent than annual revisions may be meticulous, but are likely to be too time-
consuming or complicated, especially in the view of limited or lagged data availability, and
thus appear less worthwhile. It is understood that statutory provisions may actually limit
the choices for an insurer, but referring again to the role model of German private health
insurance, an annual cycle seems both sensible and feasible if the specific portfolio serves as
a reference point. As insurers cannot predict future overall mortality tendencies either, it is
further assumed that adjustments of benefits should be made on the basis of a best estimate
using actuarial practice and expertise. Again, regulators may determine specific methodologies
or models to be applied for this purpose, and for the subsequent analysis one such provision
based on the Lee-Carter model introduced above will be presented in Section 3.2.
3 Investigating Mortality-Indexed Annuities
3.1 Model Setup
The mortality-indexed annuity (MIA) with the basic features outlined in Section 2.5 is to be
further analyzed here. Especially the question of whether from a policyholder’s perspective
such an innovation tends to be advantageous or not is not yet answered, while clearly annuity
providers should have a special interest in dispelling the aggregate longevity risk inherent to
conventional life annuities. By means of a Monte-Carlo simulation different developments of
actual, previously unknown mortality are investigated regarding their effect on the mortality-
index annuity proposed, i.e. a large number of scenarios is generated and results thus obtained
are further analyzed.
Assuming in a first step – as mentioned before – that the experience from the respective
insurer’s portfolio is drawn upon when making adjustments to the remaining survivors’ annuity
benefits (or face values) FVt at time t, a sufficiently large portfolio of identical annuity contracts
is considered with an initial size of lx at time t = 0. Insured persons in the considered pool
are assumed to be homogeneous in the sense of identical risk exposures and identical monetary
amounts stipulated in their contracts.22 This also includes an identical age x at t = 0 as
well as the same gender for all insured so that effectively only a single cohort is considered.
The contracts are assumed to be sold to policyholders against a single upfront premium in
the amount of pi0, which can also be considered the initial per-contract reserve V0, and the
premium is considered to be exogenously given throughout the entire analysis.
Given a best estimate of future mortality, the annual benefit FV0 is set at time t = 0 for the
remaining annuity term of T years using the equivalence formula23
22 For the purpose of profit sharing and attributing investment returns to individual contracts, German insurers
are required to split their entire portfolio into smaller groups of similar contracts (Abrechnungsverbände) in
order to reflect the different characters of e.g. term life insurance versus life annuities. This notion resembles
the assumed homogeneity of the portfolio.
23 The symbols in the formal expressions below follow the International Actuarial Notation standard as intro-
duced in many actuarial text books; see e.g. Bowers et al. (1997).
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pi0 = V0 = FV0 · a¨1x:T (3.1)
so that FV0 =
V0
a¨1
x:T
= pi0
a¨1
x:T
(3.2)
Here, a¨1
x:T is the actuarial present value of a T -year unit life annuity immediate
24 as deter-
mined using the mortality information and projections available at time t = 0 and assuming a
constant discrete interest rate of i per period (or year). Such a “pure” life annuity pays a unit
for as long as a person initially aged x is alive, but not beyond his or her (x+ T )-th birthday,
i.e.
a¨1
x:T =
T−1∑
k=0
{kpx · vk} where v = 11 + i (3.3)
For each future point in time t the insurer determines the respective per-contract reserve Vt
for the remaining survivors. Based on this information future annuity benefits FVt are set –
considered to be valid from time t on for the remainder of the contract term unless further
deviations from expected mortality developments occur.
Given that lx+t−1 insured were alive at the beginning of the previous year t−1 the number of
survivors at time t is lx+t. The new per-contract reserve Vt for survivors is then determined by
considering which amount could be brought forward from the previous period, i.e. the previous
year’s reserve less the annuity payment at the beginning of the previous period – accrued
at interest, but also accounting for the redistribution of the reserves from those who passed
away in the meantime to those still alive. This can also be considered an inheritance effect or
survivor bonus.25
More formally, at time t
we require lx+t−1 · Vt−1 − FVt−1
v
= lx+t · Vt (3.4)
so that Vt =
lx+t−1
lx+t
· Vt−1 − FVt−1
v
= Vt−1 − FVt−1
v · lx+t/lx+t−1
= (Vt−1 − FVt−1) · (1 + i)
lx+t/lx+t−1
(3.5)
Note that all these computations are based entirely on already observable information, since
at time t it should be known to the annuity provider how many insureds have survived and
how many were alive at the beginning of the previous period. At this point, projections or
forecasts are thus not needed.
24 An annuity immediate pays benefits in advance at the beginning of each period whereas an annuity due pays
in arrears at the end of each period – both contingent on the insured person still being alive at the beginning
of the respective year.
25 Ruß (2000) comments on different mechanisms how to combine death and survivor benefits in investment-
linked insurance products recurring to these effects as basic principles of insurance. In fact, the Law of Large
Numbers explicitly balances individual differences in mortality to guarantee a stable average value. See also
Blake et al. (2003).
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Given that the actual per-contract reserve Vt has been determined, the new (adjusted) benefit
FVt is set in a similar way as at time t = 0; see (3.2):
Vt = FVt · a¨ 1x+t:T−t
so that FVt =
Vt
a¨ 1
x+t:T−t
(3.6)
Of course a¨ 1
x+t:T−t is the updated actuarial present value of a (T−t)-year annuity immediate
for a person now aged x+ t made at time t, relying on a new best estimate for future mortality
at that time.
It is insightful at this point to consider a situation where initial mortality expectations are
correct and do not have to be revised, i.e. actual developments of mortality exactly follow the
longevity trend incorporated at the contract inception. Of course, this case is just the absence of
systematic risk. As mortality is not deterministic either, fluctuations of individuals’ mortality
around the (correctly forecasted) general average still occur so that in this case unsystematic
risk is the only source of uncertainty. However, if we consider a theoretically infinite number
of contracts in a portfolio, the Law of Large Numbers guarantees that individual fluctuations
balance, and on average the insurer does not experience deviations from the projected trend
in the sense that actual relative frequencies of death exactly correspond to the probabilities
predicted by the model.26 In this hypothetical case, the evolution of reserves as per (3.5) exactly
follows the initial calculation made in (3.1), and at every point in time the reserves brought
forward from the preceding period exactly match the required funds for future payments in
the (then constant) amount of FVt ≡ FV0. Eventually, in year T (or rather at the beginning
of the T -th period) no deficits nor excess reserves are due, which effectively means that on an
actuarial basis the insurer would not have losses nor profits.
However, as in reality portfolio sizes will always be finite numbers there is some uncertainty
with respect to the difference between relative frequencies and projected probabilities, and
even in the absence of systematic longevity risk (i.e. if projections are still perfect on average)
the insurer experiences deviations of the actual evolution of the portfolio reserves as per (3.5)
from previous expectations so that adjustments of benefits might still be necessary. This delib-
eration shows that in the product proposed so far, both the systematic and the unsystematic
longevity risk are shifted back to policyholders, and they are only able to insure the individual
longevity risk in the sense that lifelong payments (but not beyond age x+T−1) are guaranteed.
However, benefits are variable and might deviate from the initial level. Further comments on
this model feature will be made later.
It should also be emphasized here what has been a consistent assumption throughout the
above equations. All calculations and subsequent analyses are made on a net actuarial basis, i.e.
only the actuarial risk is taken into account. In particular, no surcharges or loadings to cover
acquisition expenses, no surplus accrual and thus distribution mechanisms, and no statutory or
regulatory requirements or restrictions in terms of reserving, investments, or product features
are included unless specifically mentioned.
Another major concern that is relevant for the present analysis is model uncertainty, and a
vital discussion of quite varying models to predict future mortality has been in the focus of
26 Again, note that model uncertainty is ignored here, assuming that the general type of stochasticity underlying
mortality developments is known.
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academia and industry for many years now. Yet no satisfactory solution could be identified
since the actual randomness of mortality seems to be too complex. In addition, trends and
findings thought to be well-fitting have occasionally turned out to be changing over time.
However, for the subsequent simulation of mortality a specific choice has to be made. In
particular, the PML extension of the Lee-Carter model (cf. Section 1) will be used for the reason
of its widespread acceptance, the apparent robustness, and its relatively easy implementation.
It is well understood, though, that there are alternative choices and that certain shortcomings
have been discussed in the literature. Yet, the drawbacks and restrictions do not seem to
outweigh the mentioned advantages.
Naturally, the mentioned restrictions place a caveat on the entire analysis and thus obtained
results as a far more complex reality will ultimately also influence results. This is especially true
for e.g. investment risk or potential basis risk due to regulatory provisions regarding admissible
choices. However, further insight and a general direction regarding the advantageousness of
risk avoidance through offering mortality-indexed annuities is expected instead.
3.2 Simulation of Mortality
To account for the true insurance character of an MIA where aggregate longevity risk is re-
transferred to policyholders (or not transfered to the insurer at all), its individual form is
explicitly included in the simulation. That way not only does the general average mortality
underly random influences but also each individual’s lifetime. Put in different words, there is
also risk for each insured that his or her individual lifetime deviates from an initial expectation.
What can be considered a “background risk” here is the fluctuation of the overall mortality
pattern. More precisely, future mortality is assumed to develop according to the LC/PML
model. The vast majority of contributions have fitted the LC/PML model to actual data
determining an ARIMA(0,1,0) model as most suitable to describe the {κt} time series. This
effectively means that at any point in time t a linear extrapolation from the current level of
κt is the best estimate (denoted as κˆt),27 and it will also be met on average under the present
assumption.28
Of course, this is only true due to the fact that model uncertainty is excluded from the
present investigation. Instead, it is assumed that it is a priori known which model underlies
the random future mortality paths. Thus, there should not be any objections to basing best
estimates for the mortality index {κt} at future times t on the same drift or trend initially
determined when calibrating the LC model.
When transferring the proposed product to real annuity markets an additional source of un-
certainty may be the question of whether structural changes have occurred or will be occurring
to the mortality patterns applicable to the portfolio of contracts under consideration. While
especially the latter question could only be answered when drawing upon epidemiological, med-
ical, or even philosophical input, the former challenge can be met easily with a reestimation
(or recalibration) of the LC model to both historical data as well as actual mortality experi-
ence between times 0 and t. Thus, forecasts from time t on could be improved compared to
27 Note that there is no distinction in the notation between a best estimate κˆt+1 made at time t for the year after
next and κˆt+1 as a best estimate made at time t + 1 for the period just begun. However, from the context
it should always be clear at what time the respective estimate has been made so that e.g. an additional
subscript appears dispensable.
28 For the remainder of the present part a tilde above a random variable symbol ·˜ shall denote actual realizations,
whereas a hat symbol ·ˆ is to indicate projections or forecasts of that random variable.
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just a periodic update. In the present context, this is not necessary due to the exclusion of
model uncertainty, and as this would also drastically increase the computational complexity, a
reestimation of model parameters is dismissed here.
However, the disturbance terms from the ARIMA model cause uncertainty about the actual
realizations κ˜t.29 This can also be interpreted in a way that at each point in time t nature
draws from the spectrum of possible mortality developments which in expected terms meets
the previous best estimate κˆt. More specifically, it is assumed that at any future time t the
uncertainty can be expressed as κ˜t = κˆt + η˜t with ηt ∼ N(0, σ2κ). Thus, the larger the time
horizon the larger the (accumulative) uncertainty about realizations κ˜t so that also uncertainty
accumulates the more distant future central death rates are.
The individual form of uncertainty about a person’s lifetime is incorporated into the simu-
lation of the proposed product, and we shall briefly comment on this idea. Given an actually
realized level of general mortality as outlined before, the result of surviving for another year
(from time t to t + 1) or passing away is modeled as the result of a Bernoulli “experiment”.
The “population size” in this experiment is identical to the number of survivors alive at time
t, lx+t, and its “success” probability is pˆx+t as determined by the overall (randomly sampled)
mortality implied by κ˜t.
Put in different words, as seen from time t the actual number of survivors l˜x+t+1 at time t+1
is a random sample from the binomial distribution Bin(lx+t, pˆx+t). However, pˆx+t is only a
best estimate for the yet unknown realization of px+t which itself is subject to the (immediate)
draw of nature. The uncertainty about the actual number of survivors is even stronger for
more distant points in time t+ k where also lx+t+k−1 is unknown and has to be replaced by a
best estimate lˆx+t+k−1.
Note also that the uncertainty about realizations of {κt} accumulates over time in the
sense that more future values of κt are less predictable. This is due to the fact that at each
intermediate point in time i = 0, . . . , t nature “draws” realizations of the disturbance terms
ηi that all accumulate up to time t. Effectively, the distribution of κt is thus more dispersed
for longer time horizons t. As the adjustment mechanism proposed for the mortality-indexed
annuities leads to both higher and lower benefits FVt at future times t since deviations from
the expected number of survivors in either direction can occur, the increasing dispersion of the
time index {κt} directly translates also into an increasing dispersion of future benefits {FVt}.
As pointed out, the present model assumes a random nature of mortality that is twofold:
neither the underlying general pattern is certain nor whether and to what extent individual
lifetimes deviate from the general levels. Obviously, by this choice both aggregate and indi-
vidual longevity are incorporated in the model. However, with the proposed possibility for
adjustments to {FVt} at any time t based on the equivalence principle as per (3.6) and resort-
ing to the best estimates at that time, the insurer offsets the risk that actual mortality deviates
from the projected (overall) trend. In this sense, the proposed mortality-indexed annuity is
always balanced from the insurer’s perspective. No deficit nor surplus is generated, and no
defaults are to be expected.
29 Hanewald et al. (2009) point out that it may be sufficient to concentrate on uncertainty arising from the
ARIMA process adapted to the {κt} time series while the majority of previous contributions have ignored
the error term. They also note that Lee and Carter (1992, Table B2) themselves noted that the former
disturbance terms account for roughly 90% of standard errors of age-specific death rate projections.
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3.3 The Benchmark: Conventional Life Annuities
While annuity providers – as pointed out earlier – might generally be interested in the idea of
not having to bear the aggregate longevity risk in mortality-indexed annuities (MIA), it still
remains to be discussed how an assessment of the degree of advantageousness of these products
can be made. More precisely, the deduction of a suitable measure has not yet been clarified.
Acknowledging that MIA do not yet exist and that the starting point for considering such
innovation will necessarily be a conventional life annuity, it seems worthwhile to parallel the
key financial figures from MIA with those from conventional products when exposed to the
same mortality experience. In brief, a conventional annuity does not provide a possibility for
the provider to adjust benefits in any fashion since those have to be set in fixed, nominal terms
at the contract inception as per (3.2). Thus, dependent on how actual mortality within the
portfolio under investigation realizes during the contract term, the reserve at the beginning of
the T -th period (i.e. at time T − 1), denoted by V ∗,convT may turn out to be insufficient or not
and will thus result in either positive or negative values.
In general, two different approaches of modeling the case of insufficient policy reserves could
be followed. Firstly, as is the case in the present paper, if during the contract term the reserve
Vt becomes negative it could be assumed that such deficit can be financed at the (unique)
interest rate i that was applied for discounting, e.g. in (3.3). An immediate justification for
such a choice could be a requirement for the insurer imposed and enforced by the regulator to
unconditionally fulfill contractual obligations. This way, policyholders would always received
the benefits stipulated in their annuity contracts. Of course, to reflect higher refinancing costs
and to introduce frictions in the capital market, an increased rate i∗ > i could additionally
be incorporated. Secondly, insurer defaults could be assumed for the case that due to adverse
longevity development the per-contract reserves are insufficient to cover an additional annuity
payment to the surviving cohort members at some point in time. Only a reduced annuity
payment could be paid to the policyholders then, and for the remainder of the contract term
no further payments would be made. Effectively, the insurer would never have to make deficits
but rather have a possibility to close down the particular portfolio. Contrarily, policyholders
would bear the risk of default or the insurer’s suspension of payments, and this aspect would
imply further deliberations with respect to the comparability of mortality-indexed annuities
and a thus modeled benchmark product. However, guaranteed lifelong payments through an
insurer’s obligation to make deficits are assumed for the remainder of this paper.
Conventional Annuities under Aggregate Longevity Risk
The exact distribution of final reserves V ∗,convT in conventional annuities is not yet known since
it depends on the realized number of survivors in the portfolio of initially lx contracts, and
those numbers fluctuate around the initial best estimates similar to the time series {κt} as
discussed above. However, annuity benefits FV0 are determined as per (3.2) in a way that if
actual mortality exactly follows the initial projection no surplus nor deficit in final reserves
is possible, i.e. the annuity benefits thus determined are actuarially fair. The fact that the
disturbance terms causing uncertainty in the LC/PML model are symmetric implies that best
estimates are met on average. Thus, losses and profits in per-policy reserves at time T can
be expected with an equal chance. Even though it has to be kept in mind that this is seen
from a (net) actuarial perspective, it is obvious that this represents a major disadvantage
for the annuity provider. It is thus quite likely that the insurer would not want to accept
such a high level of risk of insufficiently funded contracts and thus might aim at reducing
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the exposure to a “safe” level. It is self-evident that complete safety in the sense that no
actuarial deficits in reserves are possible cannot be attained. However, it is reasonable that the
annuity provider in charge of offering the benchmarking conventional life annuities would want
to reduce the “shortfall” (or deficit) risk from 50% substantially, and this can most easily be
achieved by incorporating a safety loading into the annuity calculation. More precisely, annual
benefits are reduced by a certain amount which in turn accumulates to soothe the high deficit
risk to acceptable levels. To facilitate a true comparison of MIA with conventional annuities,
a specific exception from a net actuarial calculation must therefore be made to reflect the
insurer’s perspective as otherwise MIA would be compared to a product which is likely to
never exist. Of course, regulatory requirements may also limit the range of actual choices in
annuity markets, and this must also be kept in mind.
In terms of the distribution of V ∗,convT , a simple way to achieve a reduction of the shortfall
risk from 50% to an acceptable lower level of α consists in a right-shift of the entire distribution,
and this can be done by building up contingency funds ∆α,T to increase the per-policy reserve.
To build up the additional amount of ∆α,T by the beginning of year T (or at time T − 1),
the insurer will likely include a certain premium surcharge or safety loading. As in the present
case an identical single upfront premium is considered for both the MIA and the benchmark
product, this is achieved by adjusting the benefits. More precisely, the initially determined
face value FV0 is reduced to FV α0 .30
However, it is not a trivial task to determine the necessary adjustment. Its exact amount
has an influence on the evolution of the per-contract reserves of the benchmark product when
including this safety loading. Thus it is not conducive to establish as contingency funds that
has to be accumulated by time T − 1 e.g. a certain quantile of the original distribution of
the reserves. The problem is that due to fluctuating mortality it can only be accumulated on
average, and the transition from FV0 to FV α0 alters the distribution of reserves from V
∗,conv
T
to V ∗,convT,α so that the intended effect is not necessarily met.31
Since a closed form expression of the actual amount of FV α0 cannot be obtained, the insurer
has to determine it e.g. by using a simulation study similar to the one presented in Section 4
in a way that reduces the frequency of deficits to the desired level of α.
The thus adjusted benefit32 FV α0 < FV0 can be considered basically the original benefit
FV0 determined by (3.2), but from each payment a certain fixed amount is deducted. This
difference can also be considered a recurring premium the insurer charges or retains to finance
the ultimate contingency funds. Or, put differently, the insurer only sells conventional life
annuities if at the same time an insurance savings scheme towards an ultimate financial cushion
is embedded in the contract.
30 As implied by the notation, it is of course subject to the admissible likelihood of actuarial losses α chosen to
determine ∆α,T .
31 To reflect the fact that the latter expression is related to the (reduced) face value of FV α0 the additional
subscript α is added to the symbol for the per-contract reserve for the benchmark product.
32 Note that this benefit is not adjusted to actual mortality experience like FVt in MIA.
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This thought can be expressed more formally in expected terms as
pi0 =
T−1∑
k=0
{FV0 · kpˆx · vk}
= FV0 · a¨1x:T see (3.1)
=
T−1∑
k=0
{FV α0 · kpˆx · vk}+ ∆α,T · vT−1T−1pˆx
= FV α0 · a¨1x:T + ∆α,T · T−1Ex (3.7)
In the last expression of (3.7), T−1Ex is a (T−1)-year pure (unit) endowment insurance for a
person aged x.33 By comparing (3.1) and (3.7) the adjusted face value FV α0 can be determined
from the non-adjusted value FV0 through
FV0 · a¨1x:T = FV α0 · a¨1x:T + ∆α,T · T−1Ex (3.8)
so that FV α0 =
FV0 · a¨1x:T −∆α,T · T−1Ex
a¨1
x:T
= FV0 − ∆α,T · T−1Ex
a¨1
x:T
= FV0 −∆α,T · s¨1x:T (3.9)
where s¨1
x:T is the actuarial accumulated value at time T contingent on survival that corre-
sponds to the same unit annuity underlying the actuarial present value a¨1
x:T .
At this point the question may arise of whether one should also consider the per-policy
reserves at any intermediate point in time t when accounting for the risk of adverse mortality
developments. Obviously, an insurer offering conventional annuities would not be willing to
accept net deficits at those points in time either. For an answer, two important features of
the comparable conventional annuities underlying the present investigation have to be kept in
mind.
Firstly, if for any actual mortality development the reserve is negative at some intermediate
point in time, it was assumed that the annuity provider may finance this shortfall at the same
fixed interest rate i that was assumed as the minimum guaranteed interest rate; cf. also the
remarks on defaults in Subsection 3.3. Although external funds raised on capital markets will
mostly not be available at such a low rate, this notion appears more realistic when considering
the possibility that a shortfall may also be financed by borrowing against some other line of
business or portfolio of contracts within the same insurance company. However, a choice of
i∗ > i could also be considered.34 As a further remark on this issue, note that reserve values
analyzed are entirely based on a net actuarial assessment, i.e. except for the safety loading
discussed above they do not include any further loadings or surcharges, and the investment
33 Note that the last annuity payments are due at time T − 1 so that it is sufficient to analyze the provider’s
financial situation at that time, and this corresponds to the fact that V ∗,convT is determined at that time as
well.
34 Note that for the subsequent simulation study, this alternative assumption produced results that only
marginally differed, and for this reason it will not be further investigated.
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yields in excess of the interest rate i are also not accounted for at this point so that in reality
it is likely that actual per-policy reserves are higher in tendency and deficits less likely and less
severe.
Secondly, and more importantly, it is to be noted that the risk of insufficient reserving is
monotonous or increasing over time. It is easy to see that once in deficit, reserves are either
only further diminished by subsequent annuity payments or additionally inflated to a greater
or lesser extent due to interest and the inheritance effect. However, the latter only reduce or
reinforce the deficit, but will never change a negative reserve back into a surplus.
As an alternative way of achieving a significant reduction of the insurer’s actuarial shortfall
risk in the benchmarking product, loading factors incorporated in life tables that are common
in the industry could be applied in the calculation of the “comparable” results. Those are
included in the tables when transiting from “second order”, i.e. “raw”, mortality data to “first
order” values used for pricing and reserving.
Another issue that has not been further discussed so far is the fact that on average there is
no actuarial profit or loss when using the unadjusted FV0. By including the safety loading, the
additional contingency funds ∆α,T per surviving policyholder accumulated over the contract
period further improves the financial situation, and the effective risk of net deficits has been
reduced to α. The resulting considerable expected profits for the benchmarking conventional
annuities, which take on positive values with a probability of 1−α, arise entirely from mortality
fluctuations. This is due to the fact that it was assumed here that the insurer does not generate
higher investment yields than the constant interest rate i and that no costs or expenses are
accounted for. A straightforward argument would then be that surplus reserves – if any – have
arisen entirely from the portfolio’s mortality exposure and thus “belong” to the policyholders.
While this argument may not be novel, the idea of actually sharing surplus from “mortality (or
risk) gains” is at least new in the German insurance market. Only recently, German legislation
has set off the surplus generated by “mortality gains” and “cost gains”. which have long been
treated differently than “investment gains” on policy reserves. Of the latter at least 90% had
been required to be credited to policyholders, and now at least 75% and 50% of surplus from
the two previously mentioned sources, respectively, are required to be attributed to individual
policies.35
Now, as in the present contribution the entire surplus (or deficit) in the final per contract
reserves is only due to “mortality gains”, the largest extent of profit sharing would be to
attribute the ultimate reserve completely to the surviving policyholders as a terminal bonus.
Naturally, this would leave the insurer with a certain result of zero, and it does not seem to
be too unrealistic given that no further costs or expenses are included in the present model.
This is exactly the same situation as for the mortality-indexed annuities focused on earlier,
and it is an open question whether a safety loading would be required at all. Effectively, only
the mechanism of how mortality fluctuations due to aggregate longevity risk are borne by the
policyholders is different now compared to MIA.36
An intuitive objection to this idea is related to the cases where the ultimate reserves are
negative, i.e. development of mortality that render the previous calculations insufficient. It is
35 Cf. also the remarks on regulatory provisions regarding profit sharing in Germany in Footnote 8 on p.5. An
abundant number of previous contributions have also discussed or analyzed profit-sharing, and for the specific
case of Germany cf. e.g. Schwintowski and Ebers (2002), Ebers (2001), or Gruschinske (1989).
36 As a specific measure for the advantageousness of MIA is proposed only later, note at this point that in
expected terms such a complete transfer of ultimate reserves in the benchmarking conventional annuity
yields exactly the same results as for the MIA.
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highly debatable whether in any insurance market negative reserves, i.e. deficits, would ever be
borne by the policyholders and how an insurer could collect this amount if necessary. Given
the high age of the “unfortunate” survivors this thought seems even more questionable and it
thus seem reasonable if at least negative reserves would be borne by the insurer. Of course,
this would greatly improve the benchmark product from the policyholders’ point of view,37 and
the insurer would certainly include a safety loading to reduce the risk of deficits that cannot
be passed on to the insureds.
Referring to the above remarks on profit sharing related to “mortality gains”, which have long
not been credited to policyholders at all, a compromise between the two extremes discussed
could consist in attributing only a certain share X (0 < X < 1) of ultimate reserves – if
they are positive – to survivors as terminal bonuses under the benchmark product. This way,
policyholders participate to a greater or lesser extent in surplus due to mortality fluctuations
but do not have to cover deficit scenarios, which would seem rather unrealistic. On the other
hand the insurer, who might not be willing to completely cede positive reserves, retains at least
the remaining fraction of (1−X) of positive surplus reserves, and the risk of deficit reserves is
to α when including a safety loading as discussed above.
For the subsequent analyses, a value ofX = 0.75 will be assumed as this reflects the minimum
required level of (mortality) surplus participation in Germany. More formally, at time T − 1,
surviving policyholders do not only receive an annuity payment in the amount of FV α0 but
also a terminal bonus of X ·max{0;V ∗,convT,α } An alternative choice of X = 0.90 has also been
considered, thus mirroring the respective minimum level related to investments according to
German regulation. Despite differences in the particular values, the overall tendency of results
presented in Section 4.2 still applied.
Comparing Mortality-Indexed Annuities and Conventional Annuities
It is more than obvious that a MIA would be (dis-)advantageous compared to a conventional
life annuity exactly when it provides higher (lower) benefits at any given future time. How-
ever, due to the fluctuations of mortality (and consequently also of adjusted benefits FVt) it
is not clear how often and to what extent the benefits are higher than FV α0 in a comparable
conventional annuity – provided that the latter includes contingency funds as discussed above.
Note that with certainty FV0 > FV α0 but that no definite statements are possible as to FVt for
future points in time. The standard assumption of risk-averse policyholders is ignored in this
context. In a further analysis the fact that risk-averse individuals being reluctant to not trans-
fer the aggregate longevity risk could also be incorporated when determining to what extent
MIA are advantageous compared to conventional products. In tendency, the excess of MIA
benefits FVt over FV α0 is diminished by the increase in risk to be borne by the policyholder.
Overall effects are thus likely to be highly dependent on the degree of individual risk aversion.
What also needs to be kept in mind is the fact that for most policyholders sooner benefits in
excess of “conventional” benefits should have a stronger weight than those in the more distant
future. Discounting should reflect such time preferences, and as it is also less likely for each
insured to actually live to see such late excess benefits, “mortality discounting” should be
incorporated through the concept of actuarial present values; cf. (3.3).
Following the overall principles governing actuarial calculation in life and pension insurance,
it thus seems worthwhile to further analyze the actuarial present value of the difference in MIA
37 Anticipating the results from the simulation presented in Section 4.2, the proposed MIA are disadvantageous
on average when compared to such an alternative benchmark product.
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benefits compared to conventional annuities as seen from time t = 0 from the policyholders’
perspective. One should expect that if the fluctuations of adjusted benefits {FVt} do not turn
out to be overly downward drifting (below the level of FV α0 ) and/or if this only occurs in the
more distant future, then the initially higher level of FV0 in comparison to FV α0 combined with
a higher likelihood for each insured to actually receive the earlier benefits at all and sooner
are likely to prevail. As a direct consequence, the mentioned “actuarial present value of MIA
excess benefits”, denoted by ADV αMIA below, will become positive, thus being in line with the
notion of a measure of advantageousness.
Note that the proposed measure ADV αMIA can generally also be obtained directly from the
ultimate per-contract reserves as the respective average across all simulation paths, discounted
to time t = 0 and reflecting the fact that only l˜x+T−1 survivors have actually survived to
the end of the contract term. However, this is only true if no terminal bonus is included
for the benchmark product in the measure of advantageousness. In that case, both ADV αMIA
and the “average discounted final reserve” exactly coincide. Yet, by accounting for a surplus
participation mechanism as outlined before, the two measures need not coincide, and in fact
ADV αMIA as given below rather expresses the advantageousness of a MIA contract from the
policyholders’ point of view, accounting for the entire potential cash flow. Contrarily, the
corresponding “average discounted final reserve” is exactly what is left for the insurer if it is
reduced by the mentioned terminal bonus.
Technically, for each scenario in the Monte-Carlo simulation the amount
ADV αMIA =
T−1∑
k=0
{(FVk − FV α0 ) · kp˜x · vk}
−X ·max{0;V ∗,convT,α } · T−1p˜x · vT−1
=
T−2∑
k=0
{(FVk − FV α0 ) · kp˜x · vk}
+(FVT−1 − (FV α0 +X ·max{0;V ∗,convT,α })) · T−1p˜x · vT−1 (3.10)
=
T−1∑
k=0
{(FVk − FV α0 ) · l˜x+k/l˜x · vk}
−X ·max{0;V ∗,convT,α } · l˜x+T−1/l˜x · vT−1 (3.11)
is computed where actual survival rates kp˜x = l˜x+k/l˜x are used. Note that ADV αMIA now
actually includes the discussed terminal bonus for the benchmark product, which can directly
be seen in (3.10).
It is interesting at this point to briefly discuss the hypothetical case mentioned earlier in the
first place. If the entire ultimate reserve V ∗,convT,α was transferred to the surviving policyholders
both in the case of positive and negative values,38 note that the expected value of ADV αMIA
would be zero as well as the average discounted V ∗,convT,α from the insurer’s point of view.
This clearly demonstrates that no added value is created just by designing and offering the
mortality-indexed annuities.
However, the asymmetric surplus sharing mechanism incorporated in (3.11) leads to quite
different degrees of advantageousness for policyholders and the insurer, and eventually both
38 This would be the case if in (3.11) the last expression X ·max{0;V ∗,convT,α } · l˜x+T−1/l˜x · vT−1 were replaced
by V ∗,convT,α · l˜x+T−1/l˜x · vT−1.
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have to ponder the downside risk, the upside potential, and the uncertainty about the exact
outcomes. For this purpose, the empirical distribution of ADV αMIA will be further analyzed in
the following section.
4 Simulation and Results
4.1 Data and Parameterization
To perform the simulation of key financial figures (and especially the measure for advanta-
geousness from the policyholders’ perspective ADV αMIA) for the mortality-indexed annuities
proposed in Section 2.5, several particular choices in terms of data and parameterizations have
to be made. Those will be detailed and motivated in the present section.
Firstly, since the simulation intends to investigate variations in the mortality (or longevity)
within a stylized homogeneous portfolio of insured and the respective implications for the
adjustments of MIA benefits, it is self-evident that the selection effect of (generally lower)
annuitant mortality versus the general population mortality should be accounted for. Thus,
due to the limited availability of such annuitant mortality data, the present simulation resorts
to a data set for the UK provided by the CMI.39 This ultimately led to the LC time index {κt}
being modeled as an ARIMA(0,1,0) time series, thus being in line with previous research.
Secondly, since there are more male annuitants than females in the mentioned data set it will
be assumed that the homogeneous cohort under investigation is composed of males exclusively.
A limited number of years covered by the data also forces to base the calibration (or parameter
estimation) of the LC/PML model on calendar years z = 1983, . . . , 2003. Consequently all
projections begin in year z = 2004 which corresponds to time t = 0. Although for calibration
purposes only ages x = 25, . . . , 110 could be considered, the cohort’s initial age is assumed to
be x = 60 at time t = 0, and the annuity term here is limited to T = 41 at the outset. Thus,
the last annuity payment is due at the beginning of the year y = 2044 (or at time t = 40,
equivalently) where all surviving cohort members have just completed their 100th birthday with
no further payments thereafter. However, ultimate financial data such as per-policy reserves
can also be considered in the “second” after the last annuity payment at time T − 1 since no
further cash flows are to occur for the remainder of the T -th year. This is simply owed to the
fact that an annuity immediate was assumed here, which makes payments in advance.
Lastly, the upfront premium considered to be exogenously given is set as pi0 = 100,000,40
and the number of generated scenarios in the Monte-Carlo simulation is set to N = 10,000
throughout the subsequent analyses.41
39 The Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (CMI) is an institution sponsored by the Faculty of Institute
of Actuaries in the UK in charge of fostering research related to mortality modeling issues. Data provided
encompasses annuitant mortality data per capita from the British insurance industry.
40 To illustrate the notion of a fixed upfront premium in the amount of pi0 it may be helpful to consider a
pre-existing individual savings plan, a term life insurance ending exactly at the annuity inception date, or an
inheritance made by the insured. In either case proceeds from these financial instruments become available
at time t = 0 exactly in the amount of pi0. An additional assumption could be that the annuity provider
cannot ask the policyholder to pay a higher upfront premium in order to establish contingency funds, but
accordingly needs to make adjustments to the initial annuity face value, i.e. provide only FV α0 instead of
FV0.
41 A precise notation would require to add a symbol j to the formula symbols introduced in this contribution
to denote that they differ by scenario. For the sake of clarity, such notation has been ignored so far and will
only be used below if explicitly necessary.
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The above outlined parameterization choices are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameterization for the Simulation of MIA Advantageousness
number of scenarios initial age annuity term single premium surplus share
N x T pi0 X
10,000 60 41 100,000 0.75
Two parameterization choices have not yet been further discussed. For the size of the ficti-
tious portfolio, i.e. the initial number of insured, two different choices are considered: On the
one hand, to reflect comfortable diversification effects, a relatively large portfolio is assumed
by setting l60 = 100,000. On the other hand, individual fluctuations of lifetime are modeled as
Bernoulli experiments with the actual number of survivors being random samples from suitably
parameterized distribution. Given the Law of Large Numbers, which states that sample means
will converge to the theoretical “true” mean of the underlying distribution upon increasing
sample sizes, it is likely that thus randomly sampled numbers of survivors will be relatively
close to the respective overall survival probabilities “drawn” by nature. To challenge individual
fluctuations to a larger extent and also accounting for the fact that in reality (primary) insurers
may only be able to compose smaller homogeneous annuity portfolios, an alternative portfolio
size of l60 = 1,000 is also considered.
For the constant interest rate i incorporated into the calculation of actuarial present values
a¨1
x:T and discounting purposes two different assumptions were made as well.
42 A quite con-
servative yet commonly found value of i = 3% p.a. is assumed as well as the more ambitious
choice of i = 5% p.a. In the long run, with the use of long-term government bonds, insurers in
many countries have been able to generate returns on their investments well above the former
choice with only moderate effort to attain the latter level.43
Table 2 provides an overview of the portfolio size and interest rate combinations, including
the abbreviations for the resulting “treatments” referred to below.
Table 2: Treatments in the Simulation of MIA Advantageousness
i
3% 5%
l60
100,000 AI AII(base case)
1,000 BI BII
For the admissible shortfall risk α values of 0.001, 0.005, and 0.01 are used to reflect rea-
sonable choices not uncommon in the industry. If necessary for distinction, the specific values
will be added as a superscript as e.g. in ADV 0.001MIA .
42 Note that the present analysis is made from a net actuarial standpoint where actual (excess) yields on
the invested reserves are disregarded. As discussed above, an adequate mechanism for redistribution of
(investment) surplus must be thoroughly considered.
43 See also Kling et al. (2007) for a thorough analysis of the effects on risk exposure that different regimes of
surplus distribution as related to investment yields being in excess of interest rate guarantees.
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4.2 Results and Discussion
When applying the parameterization and underlying data outlined in Section 4.1 to the Monte-
Carlo simulation model introduced in Section 3.1, the data being computed is extensive: Four
treatments with N = 10,000 scenarios each were run, and in each run j, a series of MIA face
values {FV jt }t=0...40 was generated,44 contingent on three different levels of α – among other
interim data necessary to actually compute the MIA developments.
Figure 1: Paths of MIA Benefits in Comparison to Conventional Annuity – Treatment AI ,
α = 0.005
7000
6500
6000
FV (0)
5500
FV(0,"=0.005)
5000
4500
time t
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
The dotted line (“FV(0)”) indicates the annuity face value FV0 = 5,632 prior to contingency funds inclusion;
the dashed line (“FV(0,α = 0.005)”) shows FV 0.0050 = 5,373.5 for a comparable conventional annuity.
For instance, for the base case treatment using α = 0.005 Figure 1 depicts the spectrum
of MIA benefit paths as well as those obtained from a comparable “conventional” life annuity
– both with and without contingency funds.45 Obviously, it is next to impossible to directly
assess this amount of data. While at first glance it may seem that paths tend to fall below the
“conventional” benefit level (dashed, lower horizontal line) quickly,46 it has also to be kept in
mind what was mentioned above in the context of deducing the measure for advantageousness.
Benefits below that threshold in the not-so-near future can be assumed to be less grave due
to discounting and mortality in the meantime. In addition, note that an annuity pays (accu-
mulative) benefits at all times contingent on survival, i.e. rather the sum of excess or deficit
benefits (or the area between each MIA path and the constant benefit of FV α0 ) is a relevant
quantity.
44 Note that no payments are due after time T − 1 so that no value of FV41 needs to be determined.
45 It is obvious and also evident from Figure 1 that for the latter case, benefits from the conventional product
coincide with the initial MIA benefit that is determined for the very first period (and later revised), as at
time t = 0 the respective best estimates coincide as well.
46 In fact, roughly half of values FV40 are lower than the initial value FV0 indicated by the dotted line in Figure
1.
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As the interest and “survival” discounting cannot easily be captured when using visualiza-
tions similar to Figure 1, MIA face values are aggregated to realizations of ADV αMIA as this
measure includes the twofold discount of interest and mortality. This effectively leaves 120,000
values for further a analysis. The remaining complexity of the results can suitably be depicted
by using histograms of the empirical distribution of ADV αMIA, such as Figure 2 for different
levels of α in the base case treatment AI and Figures 3, 4, and 5 for analogous representations
for the other treatments AII , BI , and BII , respectively. Further analysis of the distributions
of ADV αMIA is intended to answer the question whether the apparent attractiveness of MIA for
insurers also applies to potential policyholders.47
Treatment AI – the Base Case
For the base case treatment AI , the innovative mortality-indexed annuity turns out to be more
advantageous than a conventional annuity in the vast majority of cases with truly disadvan-
tageous scenarios in only few cases; see Figure 2. In fact, the MIA provides an average level
of ADV αMIA of between roughly 1,050 and 1,350 – depending on α. Given that FV0 is 5,632,
these values correspond to 19% to 24% of an annual benefit payment. For treatment AI , these
values (among a selection of risk measures) are listed in Table 3 separated by the insurer’s
shortfall risk α. What can also be observed is the fact that the downside or “shortfall” risk
ℙ [ADV αMIA < 0] is iddentical to α.48 Thus it is rather unlikely that the innovative product is
truly disadvantageous. Obviously, the smaller α, i.e. the smaller the insurer’s admissible actu-
arial shortfall risk, the more advantageous are potential MIA benefits. This is simply due to
the fact that a higher α requires FV α0 to be lower, ceteris paribus, in order for the contingency
funds ∆α,T to be available by time T .
Figure 2: Empirical Distribution of ADV αMIA – Treatment AI
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(b) α = 0.005
FV α0 = 5,373.50
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(c) α = 0.010
FV α0 = 5,393.50
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Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
Another more general measure for the riskiness would be the variability of the (degree of)
advantageousness. The empirical variances are therefore also listed in Table 3, and apart from
the fact that the actual differences in relative terms are quite small compared to their high
levels, an increase of the variability can still be observed.
47 Recall that ADV αMIA was developed as a measure for the advantageousness of MIA in comparison to conven-
tional life annuities – if only the insurer includes a safety loading to reduce the risk of deficit net reserves to
α.
48 Of course, this is due to the design of the surplus participation accounted for in ADV αMIA.
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Obviously advantageous scenarios are very likely while the policyholders’ downside risk is
limited to α, but it is also interesting to further analyze how negative potential adverse sce-
narios may be. For this purpose, also the expected [policyholder] shortfall (or rather “expected
MIA disadvantageousness”) is computed, i.e. 피 [ADV αMIA | ADV αMIA < 0]. Those values provide
an idea of the severity of waiving to transfer aggregate longevity risk to an annuity provider,
and the respective quantities are also provided in Table 3. It is not surprising then that with
a higher α (and thus also higher values of FV α0 or smaller safety loadings) the general level of
ADV αMIA is lower, and consequently also expected shortfalls take on more negative values.
Table 3: Key Figures from Treatment AI
Annuity Benefits α = 0.001 α = 0.005 α = 0.010
FV0 5,631.67
FV α0 5,330.00 5,373.50 5,393.50
Risk Measure
피 [ADV αMIA] 1,354.12 1,159.54 1,068.75
ℙ [ADV αMIA < 0] 0.001 0.005 0.010
Var [ADV αMIA] 220,915.5 229,915.0 238,233.3
피 [ADV αMIA | ADV αMIA < 0] −321.29 −492.31 −520.37
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
A further question is the issue of marketability. More precisely, assuming that the insurer
does not intend to (or, for reasons of competitiveness, may not) conceal the downside potential
in MIA contracts, it is at least questionable how well it would be received by insurees despite its
reduction to α. Naturally, an immediate attractive counterargument can be brought forward:
the (non-reduced) annuity benefit FV0 that can be provided when policyholders agree to bear
the aggregate longevity risk is initially higher than the comparable value of FV α0 .
An individual’s risk perception, assessment, or willingness to bear longevity risk would also
be an influencing factor related to this issue. For instance, individuals with worse than average
health that would already have been driven out of typical annuity markets due to adverse
selection might be very interested to enjoy this initial head start of MIA in comparison to
the benchmark product since the latter might appear to be overpriced for them. Although
certainly a further advantage of MIA, a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
Treatment AII
When transiting to treatment AII , i.e. incorporating a higher interest rate of i = 5%, a very
general first observation is that the graphical representations in Figure 3 do not drastically
differ from those of treatment AI . However, on closer inspection it is also evident that the
respective distributions of ADV αMIA are slightly more compressed without a higher shortfall
risk. This is already revealed by Figure 3 but more so by the respective risk measures provided
in Table 4.
In particular, the empirical means are significantly reduced by roughly 225− 280 compared
to treatment AI to levels of between 850 and 1,075 (see Table 4). Also, the expected shortfalls
are smaller (in absolute terms) now, and these observations demand some further commenting.
Firstly, a higher interest rate primarily has an influence on the actuarial present values
a¨1
x:T which are lower compared to the case of i = 3% due to the stronger discounting; see
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Figure 3: Empirical Distribution of ADV αMIA – Treatment AII
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(b) α = 0.005
FV α0 = 6,725.70
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(c) α = 0.010
FV α0 = 6,743.45
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Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
Table 4: Key Figures from Treatment AII
Annuity Benefits α = 0.001 α = 0.005 α = 0.010
FV0 6,975.56
FV α0 6,679.05 6,725.70 6,743.45
Risk Measure
피 [ADV αMIA] 1,075.60 907.29 842.33
ℙ [ADV αMIA < 0] 0.001 0.005 0.010
Var [ADV αMIA] 142,381.3 147,804.8 152,138.2
피 [ADV αMIA | ADV αMIA < 0] −448.61 −413.32 −391.25
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
(3.3). When inspecting (3.2), this obviously results in a higher level of FV0 given that the
upfront premium remains unchanged.49 Similarly, in (3.6) the higher interest rate results in
higher annuity benefits FVt as the updated actuarial present values a¨ 1x+t:T−t are also increased.
However, the effect on (3.5) is ambiguous. For the case of t = 1, a higher value of i obviously
yields a higher value of V1,50 but for times t > 1 both Vt−1 and FVt−1 are higher compared
to the base case so that a general statement on the evolution of per-policy reserves Vt is not
possible. Naturally, the claimed effect on (3.6) is rendered ambiguous.
For the benchmarking conventional annuity, rearranging (3.7) and taking into account that
both a¨1
x:T and T−1Ex are lower under a higher i suggests that FV
α
0 must be higher as again
the upfront single premium pi0 is considered fixed, but this is also contingent on a constant
value of ∆α,T .
The described theoretically motivated effects on both FV0 and FV α0 can also clearly be
identified in the first lines of Table 4 in comparison to the respective values in Table 3. However,
the difference between FV0 and FV α0 is lower now; for instance, in the case of α = 0.001 it is
now only 296 instead of 302 units compared to treatment AI . Therefore, a higher interest rate i
49 Compare the remarks on this assumption in Footnote 40 on p.21.
50 Recall that the initial reserve is identical to the upfront single premium, i.e. V0 = pi0.
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seems to work marginally in favor of the conventional annuity, where only a lower initial benefit
adjustment from FV0 to FV α0 is necessary to incorporate the safety loading that accumulates
to the desired contingency funds and thus reduces the insurer’s shortfall risk to a given level of
α. Yet the (initial) levels of benefits for both the innovative MIA and the conventional product
are considerably higher under a higher interest rate i.
Secondly, as the measure of advantageousness ADV αMIA is based on the actuarial present
value of the difference between MIA benefits evolution and the comparable conventional bene-
fits FV α0 , (3.11) reveals that discounting with a higher fixed interest rate i also has an influence.
Obviously, when increasing i from 3% to 5% the stronger discounting through a lower discount-
ing factor v causes ADV αMIA to be lower ceteris paribus. On the other hand, as pointed out
above, the (initially) lower difference between FV0 and FV α0 has an adverse effect. However, as
is evident from Figure 1, negative (and positive) differences between FVt and FV α0 are rather to
be expected in the long run, and such later deficit (or excess) benefits for the MIA product tend
to be stronger the longer the time horizon is. Even though negative differences are weighed less
now, the enormous upside potential for strongly positive realizations of ADV αMIA is compressed
by stronger discounting, and as lower levels of e.g. 피 [ADV αMIA] in Table 4 compared to the
base case show, the latter effect obviously prevails.
A stronger discounting in the case of i = 5% also causes such negative differences of benefits
to have a lower impact on the advantageousness of MIA. i.e. deficits (and excesses, likewise)
are far more attenuated as already mentioned, and the obvious consequence for treatment AII
in comparison to the base case can also be observed from Table 4 versus Table 3: the empirical
variances are less than two thirds of what they had been before. Interestingly, the expected
shortfalls are less dispersed for different levels of α (in absolute terms). Yet they are higher
or lower now compared to treatment AI which is somewhat contradictory in the view of the
higher means and reduced variances. Obviously, there is an effect that causes the tails to be
fatter now.
Treatments BI and BII
If the much smaller portfolios from treatments BI and BII with only l60 = 1,000 insureds are
considered, the above findings still apply accordingly. More precisely, the higher interest rate
of 5% in treatment BII versus a moderate 3% in treatment BI has an overall effect that is
similar to the above comparison of AI and AII . The initial annuity benefits FV0 and FV α0 are
higher for the higher interest rate and the empirical means are significantly lower under higher
interest rates. This is again the immediate consequence of a compression of the distributions of
ADV αMIA, but of course contingent on α. The difference can also be identified in the diagrams
in Figure 5 versus those in Figure 4, and Tables 5 and 6 give the relevant key figures. Similar
to the previous cases of treatments AI and AII , the distributions under a higher interest rate
are more compressed, which is evident from a reduction of the variances by roughly one third
and likewise less negative expected shortfalls (or “expected policyholder disadvantageousness”
of MIA). However in the “B” case no effect on the tails of the distribution of ADV αMIA can be
identified. Thus, a higher interest rate works in a similar same fashion here despite the lower
number of contracts in the underlying portfolios of insured. One conclusion is that results are
much more sensitive to discounting than they are to different portfolio sizes.
However, another observation is the overall difference of the results under treatments BI and
BII compared to those in the case of larger annuity portfolios. Obviously, the fact that the
Law of Large Numbers works less well here causes stronger deviations of the actual number
of survivors from the initial best estimates. Accumulating over time, these deviations cause
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Figure 4: Empirical Distribution of ADV αMIA – Treatment BI
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(b) α = 0.005
FV α0 = 5,334.00
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(c) α = 0.010
FV α0 = 5,358.50
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Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
Table 5: Key Figures from Treatment BI
Annuity Benefits α = 0.001 α = 0.005 α = 0.010
FV0 5,631.67
FV α0 5,285.50 5,334.00 5,358.50
Risk Measure
피 [ADV αMIA] 1,552.15 1,335.36 1,224.22
ℙ [ADV αMIA < 0] 0.001 0.005 0.010
Var [ADV αMIA] 274,235.1 285,507.6 297,112.2
피 [ADV αMIA | ADV αMIA < 0] −329.35 −501.95 −577.94
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
a more dispersed distribution of per-policy reserves for the conventional product used as a
benchmark. In turn, to reduce deficit reserves here and make the benchmark comparable, the
contingency funds need to be increased compared to the case of the larger portfolios discussed
before. In turn, conventional annuities deliver benefits that are smaller in the “B” treatments
when compared to the respective numbers from the “A” treatments. This is evident from the
values for FV α0 in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Thus, in (3.11) the differences between FVt
and FV α0 tend to be larger ceteris paribus, and this immediately leads to values of ADV αMIA
that are generally higher. In short: the “B” distributions are shifted to the right, which is
also evident e.g. from the higher empirical means in Tables 5 and 6 when compared to Tables
3 and 4, respectively. Interestingly, the dispersions in treatments with smaller portfolios are
roughly 1.24 − 1.27 times what they had been before, and as a direct consequence expected
“shortfalls” take on more negative values due to a less perfect diversification. In general, the
overall prospect for benefits under MIA is considerably better for smaller portfolios. However,
if negative developments occur they are slightly more severe than in the case of larger annuity
portfolios with the exception of AII , possibly due to some effect on the tails.
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Figure 5: Empirical Distribution of ADV αMIA – Treatment BII
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(b) α = 0.005
FV α0 = 6,681.65
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(c) α = 0.010
FV α0 = 6,706.70
f
−1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0.
00
00
0.
00
02
0.
00
04
0.
00
06
0.
00
08
0.
00
10
0.
00
12
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
Table 6: Key Figures from Treatment BII
Annuity Benefits α = 0.001 α = 0.005 α = 0.010
FV0 6,975.56
FV α0 6,630.0 6,681.65 6,706.70
Risk Measure
피 [ADV αMIA] 1,252.78 1,066.36 974.60
ℙ [ADV αMIA < 0] 0.001 0.005 0.010
Var [ADV αMIA] 179,131.4 186,334.4 193,778.4
피 [ADV αMIA | ADV αMIA < 0] −273.36 −433.16 −488.91
Source: authors’ calculation, based on data provided by the CMI.
29
5 Summary and Conclusion
As discussed in Section 1, the rather welcome longevity trend also has some implications that
have to be cautiously accounted for by both individuals and insurance companies. For the
latter, when doing annuity and pension business, there is evidence that the aggregate form of
longevity risk transferred by such contracts represents a severe systematic risk. It is obvious
that the high correlation of individual risks and thus the potential for accumulative losses
are a major drawback for insurers. More precisely, unforeseen deviations of actual mortality
development from previous expectations can barely – if at all – be hedged or diversified so that
the question seems legitimate if insurers should decline to assume this particular risk.
Following the example of German private health insurance that was briefly introduced in
Section 2.3 as a “role model”, a redesign of conventional life annuities is proposed where ben-
efits contingent on survival are linked to actual mortality experience of a certain reference
group. The fact that such products basically do not seem to exist appears rather astonish-
ing given the existence of similar product innovations, such as e.g. unit-linked products. The
mortality-indexed annuities (MIA) are further analyzed by comparing their variable benefits
to those from a comparable conventional product, assuming that the latter would include a
safety margin or contingency funds to reduce the insurer’s risk of incurring deficit reserves
as discussed in further detail in Section 3.3. The benchmark product also includes a sizeable
(mortality) surplus participation through a terminal bonus. Effectively, the annual differences
of benefits from MIA and comparable contracts are aggregated similar to an actuarial present
value of these differences using actual survival rates.
The results from a Monte-Carlo simulation under various parameterizations presented in
Section 4.2 reveal that policyholders are in general better off with the innovative MIA, although
there is some risk. More precisely, the degree of advantageousness varies greatly, i.e. empirical
distributions feature relatively large dispersions, and this is a direct consequence of the fact
that aggregate longevity risk is effectively not transfered but borne by the insured. The overall
tendency, though, is a pronounced advantageousness of MIA since contingency funds are not
necessary here so that MIA benefits are generally higher. The downside risk in the sense that
MIA may actually be disadvantageous for policyholders, i.e. benefits from MIA become lower
than in a comparable conventional annuity contract, is just as low as the remaining deficit risk
for the benchmark annuity provider.
Results obviously depend on this quantity and thus the safety loading of the benchmark
product. The smaller it is the larger the loading or equivalently the difference in (initial) bene-
fits. As a higher difference provides an additional head start for mortality-indexed annuities, it
is logically consistent that the degree of advantageousness as measured by ADV αMIA increases
as α and thus the adverse potential for policyholders decreases. The upside potential can be
a strong argument in favor of MIA, as similar to the transition from conventional annuities
to investment-linked contracts, some policyholders may find it appealing to be offered such
contracts. Yet, further analyses would also have to take into account the individual attitude
towards risk or, more precisely, the degree of risk aversion.
What needs to be further considered is the fixed guaranteed interest rate for both the MIA
and the conventional annuity, assumed to be either 3% or 5%. In reality, it is not unlikely
that the insurer’s investments of the collected premiums (or policy reserves) will yield higher
returns.
30
One may thus argue that it is not adequate to assume such a simple annuity contract without
(investment) profit sharing. For instance, German insurance companies have traditionally
almost exclusively offered participating insurance contracts in both the life insurance and the
annuities markets.51
However, that approach leads to an entirely different regime of guarantee(s),52 and it highly
depends on the regulatory or legislative environment. Besides a potential increase of risk ex-
posure for insurance companies contingent on the design of policy guarantees,53 it also raises
the question of how such mechanisms or guarantees would have to be valued.54 Nevertheless, a
further analysis aiming at a higher degree of reality could assume stochastic investment yields
from a suitable mix of e.g. stocks and bonds, combined with a mechanism of profit sharing.
Yet, the computational complexity of the model presented here would be greatly increased. In
tendency, both the innovative MIA as well as the benchmarking annuities would be even more
profitable for policyholders, and it remains to be seen whether the overall effect would change
the results discussed above.
Another important caveat must be made at this point as the problems arising from model
uncertainty are ignored in the present investigation. Rather it was assumed that the LC/PML
approach represents the model underlying actual mortality so that the insurer’s projections
based on the same model were only subject to the explicit stochasticity incorporated in the
LC/PML model. Also, parameter uncertainty might render the model calibration and thus
projections erroneous. Reality is likely to originate more sophisticated fluctuations or structural
changes, and it remains a challenge for the industry and academia to improve and further the
achievements of adequate mortality modeling.
Both uncertainties will actually increase the variations of ultimate reserves for the benchmark
product, so that the safety loading would have to be larger to still attain the same low shortfall
risk. This would in turn lead to higher levels of advantageousness, but the MIA benefits would
also be more dispersed so that the overall effect remains ambiguous at this point. The same
argument applies when considering alternative mortality models that might be less conservative
and produce more deviating projections.55
Insofar as the models used for projections by the insurance company (or prescribed by regu-
51 For an insightful analysis of annuity types and different designs offered in the German market as well as an
evaluation for different types of customers, see von Gaudecker and Weber (2004).
52 The rather complex mechanism of accounting provisions regarding surplus determination shifts the at-
tributable profits across periods, and ultimately allocated it to individual contracts. In addition, despite
the existence of certain provisions insurance companies enjoy a wide flexibility in the shifting of profits across
time. The German Federal Court of Justice recently criticized the prevailing practice of insurers’ surplus
attribution, which largely favored uncanceled contracts by means of overly large terminal bonuses, for its
lack of transparency; see BGH IV ZR 162/03, IV ZR 177/03, IV ZR 245/03. Providers were thus obliged
to “adequately” account for the development of reserves underlying surplus participation. As a consequence
§153 VVG (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz) was revised and the Verordnung über die Mindestbeitragsrücker-
stattung in der Lebensversicherung (Mindestzuführungsverordnung – MindZV) as of April 04, 2008 (see
BGBl. I S. 690) replaced the previously applicable Verordnung über die Mindestbeitragsrückerstattung in
der Lebensversicherung (ZRQuotenV) as of July 23, 1996 (see BGBl. I S. 1190) for new business.
53 See Kling et al. (2007) for an analysis in the case of life insurance companies. They note the dominant role
of the design of the guarantee as this largely influences their findings.
54 See Bauer et al. (2006).
55 A relatively simple way to mimic increasing uncertainty about projections over time could consist in multi-
plying the ARIMA disturbance term used to model the time index in the LC/PML approach with a factor
increasing over time, such as e.g.
(
1 + t100
)
.
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lators) are considered faulty or insufficient, model uncertainty or diagnosis risk56 gives insurers
an incentive to include additional safety margins to account for these risks, and this would
further improve the advantageousness of the proposed MIA.
It is also to be noted that under the present setup the MIA product effectively transfers not
only systematic mortality (or longevity) risk back to policyholders but also the unsystematic
portion. When adjusting benefits, fluctuations of the number of survivors are not further
distinguished with respect to their origin, i.e. to what extent they arise from general changes
in the underlying mortality pattern (systematic risk) or whether they are due to the deviation
of individuals’ mortality from the portfolio average.57 This observation directly connects to the
issue of which portfolio’s mortality experience may be used by the insurer to make adjustments.
The chosen implementation assumes that the actual portfolio mortality experience may serve
as the relevant measure for adjustments of benefits. Effectively, more risk than initially dis-
cussed is shifted back to policyholders, and it may be worthwhile to reflect on the question
whether such a strong(er) cutback of risk otherwise borne by the annuity provider is conducive.
Recall that the objective of the proposed MIA was to reduce or avoid the potential for accu-
mulative losses due to systematic changes in the longevity trend. When also shifting back
the unsystematic portion of longevity risk, this objective is obviously exceeded. Of course, an
alternative would be to model an additional mortality experience that not necessarily coincides
with that of the portfolio under investigation. An example of such “more general” data would
be an industry or population index, or an aggregate company measure that also includes other
lines of life or annuity business. However, the reason for not incorporating such diverging
mortality experiences here is a facilitation of the computations.
Eventually the fact that the present case can be considered the most extreme scenario of risk
avoidance can be taken as an argument to consider the present results as the “worst case” for
policyholders.58 When only shifting back the systematic risk, some thoughts on the tendency
of changes in results are possible. Naturally, the insurer still bears the unsystematic longevity
risk, the result would in tendency be better for the policyholders, as the difference of adjusted
benefits compared to a comparable conventional product would be larger ceteris paribus. Fol-
lowing the argumentation in Section 3.3, contingency funds could now also be necessary for
the MIA contracts due to the unsystematic risk borne by the insurer. As this might counteract
the improvement of ADV αMIA sketched before, the overall effect is ambiguous and thus further
analyses are indispensable.
Another extension of the present paper could be costs and expenses. As pointed out earlier,
the present assessment was entirely made on a net actuarial basis, i.e. without costs, expenses,
or (investment) profit-sharing etc. – with the exception of the safety loading for the benchmark
56 Karten (2000) identifies diagnosis risk as the uncertainty about an insurer’s assumption regarding the stochas-
ticity of losses. This term thus almost coincides with that of model uncertainty.
57 Of course, the latter cause would be the effect of an imperfect diversification across individual risks in the
portfolio of contracts. More formally, the effect asserted by the Law of Large Numbers only holds for a
theoretically infinite number of contracts, and as this never coincides with reality there is the risk of such
deviations.
58 An interesting argument to consider is that fact that the entire mortality risk is effectively borne by the
policyholders, which is as a distinct feature of a mutual insurer. In that case, however, no self-contained
insurance company would be in charge of bearing a certain portion of the risk transfered by policyholders,
but instead the party referred to as the annuity provider consists in an entity organizing the balancing of
risks among the members of this mutual insurer, but does not bear any risk itself.
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product. Actual products rarely offer a fair premium without any surcharges or loadings, and
costs that are typically included pertain to the policy acquisition (i.e. commissions payable to
insurance agents and the costs of checking and processing applications) and the running of the
insurance company.59 For a true comparison, not only MIA but also the benchmark product
would have to include expenses and loadings, and it is not obvious at this point in which case
the respective costs would be higher.
Further discussion and deliberations regarding mortality-indexed annuities (MIA), which
upon closer investigation do not appear so surprising, may be necessary to ultimately appraise
whether the indicated advantages outweigh potential problems associated with this concept.
In the view of the potentially advantageous features of mortality-linked annuities, individuals
who in general seem to be rather reluctant to buy life annuities60 could be given additional
incentives to do so.
59 Many actuarial textbooks provide an introduction of how to include initial and recurring costs into pricing
and reserving of insurance contracts as a transition from a net perspective presented in the first place; see
e.g. Bowers et al. (1997, Ch.15).
60 This empirical observation in contrast to the theoretical optimality of complete annuitization of wealth is
generally discussed in the literature as the “annuity puzzle”; see Yaari (1965); Davidoff et al. (2005).
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